The banking literature focuses extensively on the phenomenon of bank entry and pays less attention to the factors driving the continuation of banking activities in foreign markets. In this paper, we analyze this important, but overlooked, issue by constructing a unique database of foreign banks that continue operating and those that have withdrawn from arguably the world's most international banking center -London. This new data set comprises information on 408 offices from 77 countries spanning the period from 1945 to 1999, giving us 4,643 observations, of which 2,795 represent offices that continue operating and 1,848 that withdrew from London during this period. Our empirical work shows that the continuation of international banking activity in London is positively related to: the setup of locally integrated organizational forms at entry; the experience in the local market; and the size of local operations. Continuation of banking activities is however negatively related to the setup of organizational forms integrated into the parent bank at entry and to the geographic distance of the home country to London. We also find that higher global economic activity increases the likelihood of international banking operations continuing in London; however, the more volatile the global economic environment, the greater the prospect of a cessation of this activity.
Introduction
Many researchers have studied the phenomenon of foreign bank entry (see, among others, Manlagñit, 2011) ; however, the factors determining the continuation of these operations have received much less attention. Perhaps one of the main reasons why this phenomenon has received less attention is the unavailability of suitable data on the incidence of international bank withdrawals (Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski, 2011) . The main contribution of this paper is to fill this important gap in the literature. We do this by assembling a new bank dataset on the continuations and withdrawals of foreign banks present in different organizational forms in, arguably, the world's most international banking center -London.
1 Our novel dataset consists of a rich set of information on 408 foreign banks from 77 countries spanning the period from 1945 to 1999, providing an unbalanced panel of 4,643 observations; 2,795 of these represent survivals and 1,848 represent withdrawals from London.
Multinational banks differ from other corporate enterprises because of the informational intensity of their products (Gray and Gray, 1981) . The costs of transacting largely non-tradable information-intensive products tends to inhibit banks from entering into licensing and franchising arrangements, that is, banks tend to appropriate greater rents by internalizing their information flows across borders (Grubel, 1977) .The extensive literature on bank entry places significant emphasis on the informational processing advantages that banks derive from their domestic customers. The empirical evidence largely supports this follow-the-customer hypothesis, that is, the informational advantage with respect to their domestic customers drives banks to set up international banking activities where their home customers are present (see, among others, Hultman and McGee, 1989; Yamori, 1998 ).
There are a few studies, however, that do not find support for this hypothesis. For example, Seth and Quijano (1993) do not find an empirically significant relationship between loans booked by U.S. operations of Japanese banks and loans contracted by Japanese manufacturing firms. Seth et al. (1998) find that foreign banks in Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and the U.K. lend more to local customers than to domestic customers. Moreover, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) and Goldberg and Johnson(1990) find that banks not only follow domestic customers but also seek new customers in markets that offer growth opportunities. These findings indicate that banks possess other strengths, aside from the informational advantage they may have with respect to their own domestic customers, which enable them to compete with local banks. These strengths comprise intangible technical, market-making and/or managerial skills that take the form of public goods and can be applied to new markets at very low marginal cost and high marginal benefit equivalent to the size of the market (Qian and Delios, 2008; Williams, 1997) . These intangibles are particularly useful in providing deposit-lending services, financial advisory services, participation in the syndicated loan market, portfolio management services, the management of Eurobond issues and complex financial instruments to global customers demanded at financial centers (Ursacki and Vertinsky, 1992) . Unlike information flows on bankcustomer relationships that are independent of the presence of other banks, the demand for these services is enhanced by proximity to other multinational banks operating in financial centers (Choi et al., 1986) .
Despite possessing significant strengths to service local and global customers at financial centers, foreign banks may still have to overcome other local barriers associated with: business practices; societal and cultural aspects; the functioning of the monetary and financial markets; supervisory and regulatory entities; and coping with volatile demand conditions over time. The operation of offices over time reduces these barriers to the extent that local experience becomes a key driver of future expansion (Johanson and Vahlne, 1997) . Ball and Tschoegl (1982) and Qian and Delios (2008) find that multinational banks internalize their advantages through nascent operations that over time act as footholds in exploiting different growth opportunities in overseas markets.
The possession of internalization strengths and experience with doing business in the local market can lead banks to expand to a point of holding a diversified portfolio of both upstream and downstream activities, signaling asset and service quality demanded by customers seeking international banking relationships (Berlin, 1987) . A well-diversified portfolio of activities enables banks to deal with changing demand conditions, as long as the costs of switching between different activities (opening and closing desks or hiring and firing staff) are not too high.
A less-diversified portfolio may lead banks to specialize in offering tailor-made financial packages, leaving them vulnerable to changing demand conditions (Buckley and Casson, 1998) .
Banks originating from some countries may be endowed with privileged conditions, which may make them better equipped to continue their operations abroad. In early studies of the benefits of internalizing home-country advantages, Fisher and Molyneux (1996) and Grosse and Goldberg (1991) find that geographic distance discouraged foreign entrants in both the U.K. and the U.S. Of the several other home-country-related advantages, in particular, regulatory quality has been found to have a significant influence on bank entry because it appeals to international customers due to the potential safety net that their banks can access in difficult conditions (Chen and Liao, 2011) . The presence of peers from the domestic market in the foreign market signals significant home country related advantages but increases competition hindering potential expansion in the foreign market (see also Ball and Tschoegl, 1982) .
Our findings show that the continuation of overseas banking operations in London is influenced by bank characteristics, domestic market-related advantages and global market conditions. Specifically, we find that continuation is positively related to initial organizational forms that are incorporated into local markets, the experience and size of the local operations, and global economic demand; furthermore, it is negatively related to initial organizational forms integrated into the parent bank, geographic distance and volatility of global economic demand.
We also find that the volatility in global economic demand has a positive influence on the chances of continuation when interacted with the size of the overseas operation. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we define and relate our main hypotheses to previous research. Section 3 presents our methodology, the dataset and the variables used to estimate the model. In Section 4, we present and discuss our results for the decision to continue in London or, conversely, withdraw from London. Finally, in Section 5, we summarize the main conclusions of our study.
Defining the hypotheses
The preceding discussion indicates that a variety of factors can influence the continuation or conversely withdrawal. In this section of the paper, we define the hypotheses that we address and test in our empirical work.
First, multinational banks internalize their ownership advantages across borders in different ways (Nachum, 2003) . The different internalization advantages are likely to figure in the organizational form adopted to operate abroad (Heinkel and Levi, 1992) . Parent banks possessing advantages in the form of information flows on domestic customers will service them through organizational forms integrated into the parent-representative offices, branches or agenciesbecause these customers are monitored more effectively by organizational forms integrated into the parent (Cerutti et al., 2007; Du, 2003) . Parent banks possessing other intangible assets that assume the form of public goods will service local and global customers through locally licensed subsidiaries and banks because local and global customers are monitored more effectively by locally integrated subsidiaries (Cerutti et al.; Du, 2003) . 2 These subsidiaries are likely to be more committed to the market than other organizational forms integrated into the parent bank.
For example, Ursacki and Vertinsky (1992) do not find a statistically significant relationship between the presence of customers and foreign branches and representative offices from the same country in Tokyo, indicative of a lack of demand for services by multinational corporations with whom banks have information processing advantages. Consequently banks with these forms of presence are more likely to withdraw from overseas markets. Another bank characteristic that is likely to influence continuation in the foreign market is experience. The early formulation of the sequential expansion model advocated incremental commitment to overseas markets to enable firms to gather information on local business conditions before sinking significant resources into the overseas market (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) . Ball and Tschoegl (1982) applied this theoretical framework to the internationalization of banking activity and showed that Japanese and U.S. banks expanded their overseas operations in the U.S. and Japan after acquiring significant experience of doing business in these markets.
Subsequent extensions of the sequential expansion model show that the experience of operating overseas plants reduces the costs of doing business in those markets (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) and facilitates the search for new opportunities (Luo and Peng, 1999) . Qian and Delios (2008) used these extensions to study the internationalization of Japanese banks and showed that the 2 Representative offices, branches and agencies are legal extensions of parent banks. They are subjected to minimal regulation, and business conducted through these offices can be booked elsewhere in the network of the parent. Subsidiaries and locally incorporated banks are separate entities belonging to the parent bank. They have to comply with local regulation and governance. Most business conducted by subsidiaries in financial centers is with local and global customers, placing them on equal footing with other domestic banks. Compared to representative offices, branches and agencies, subsidiaries are costlier to set up and operate. The choice between organizational forms integrated into the parent and organizational forms with local incorporation involves trading off parent and home central bank support and local regulatory control and the costs of local incorporation and improved governance (see, among others, Du, 2003; Tschoegl, 2004) .
experience acquired by these banks in servicing local markets enabled them to augment their business with local customers. Tschoegl (2002) also finds that the experience acquired by overseas banks in Norway increased their propensity to continue operating there.
Hypothesis 1b: There is a positive relationship between the experience of local operations of foreign banks and their continuation in the same foreign market.
The size of the local operation, another bank characteristic, is also likely to influence continuation in the foreign market. 3 The size of the operation is likely to be determined via a combination of internalization advantages possessed by banks to service local and global customers and experience acquired over time in counteracting the deterring effects of a lack of familiarity with local business, markets and regulatory conditions. Strong internalization advantages and experience allow banks to operate large concerns involved in servicing several markets in the vicinity, preferably exhibiting uncorrelated demand, and in providing a portfolio of products (Buckley and Casson, 1998) . These large concerns are likely to give banks the flexibility to deal with fluctuating demand over time and to reap the advantages of contiguity to other multinational banks but, at the same time, lock them into the financial center. Small concerns operating in niche segments may be more vulnerable to fluctuating demand conditions and less committed to the market, making them more likely to withdraw. The size and scope of the activity of foreign banks in several financial centers is documented by Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) . Their regressions relating the level of presence of domestic customers with whom banks might have information processing advantages and the size of the financial market could not alone explain the staffing levels of foreign banks in several financial centers, leading them to conclude the involvement of these banks over a wider geographic space and products. Second, there is evidence that suggests the benefits of internalizing home-country advantages. First, the geographic distance to the host country can influence the continuation of overseas operations. On the one hand, the lower monitoring costs of offices in nearby locations 3 The main tangible assets owned by foreign banks include offices and equipment, often rented on short leases, and staff (Khoury, 1979) . The main intangibles include costs sunk in hiring and training staff, establishing contacts, putting procedures and routines in place and acquiring reputation (Casson, 2000) . The overall size of the operation is likely to be a combination of the expenses related to the early termination of lease contracts; severance staff; the cessation of procedures and routines; loss of reputation; and the costs sunk in hiring and training staff. Because all these elements are extremely difficult to assemble, we follow Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) , Khoury (1979) , and Ursacki and Vertinsky (1992) in estimating the potential size of the operation through the staffing level.
might lead one to expect that banks from countries relatively close to the host country should find it easier to continue operating offices in nearby countries. However, on the other hand, banking requires a local presence to provide many non-tradable services; therefore, the farther from the home market a foreign destination is, the more likely a local office is required to service those overseas customers. Fisher and Molyneux (1996) and Grosse and Goldberg (1991) Analogous to geographic distance, banks also benefit from internalizing domestic regulatory quality, which can also influence the continuation of foreign operations of multinational banks. Customers intending to establish international banking relationships value banks headquartered in robust and efficient regulatory jurisdictions, as this signals asset and service quality and also support of the domestic central banking system (Berlin, 1987) . In a recent study spanning several countries Chen and Liao (2011) show that restrictive regulation and supervision in the domestic market significantly increases margins of the foreign operations of banks from these countries. Banks originating from the same domestic market possess country-related internalization advantages that are shared by their direct peers but not by other multinational banks. The presence of several banks from the same home country however places them in direct competition, as country-related advantages internalized by banks may no longer act as a differentiating factor in services provided to local and global customers. It is thus possible that the more banks there are from the domestic market in the foreign market, the stiffer the competitive conditions that banks will have to face to continue operating in the overseas market. Ball and Tschoegl (1982) find a positive but non-significant relationship between the number of banks from the domestic market and the propensity of Japanese and U.S. banks to expand their operations in the U.S. and Japan, respectively.
Hypothesis 2c: There is a negative relationship between the presence of competitors from the same domestic market and the continuation of foreign banking operations.
Third, major international financial centers offer banks the possibility of internalizing their advantages by offering services that are independent of the presence of other multinational banks, for example, services provided to domestic customers with whom banks have information processing advantages and dealings in domestic monetary and capital markets, as well as services whose demand is enhanced by the presence of other multinational banks through the reduction of search costs for customers and concurrently increasing demand for all banks at the financial center (see also Choi et al., 1986; Jones, 1992; Kindleberger, 1974) . Thus, while the presence of competitors from the same home market places banks under increased competitive pressure, reducing the propensity to continue operating; the presence of banks from other markets increases the propensity of continuing operations in the overseas market. Finally, following previous studies of financial centers (Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996; Ursacki and Verstinky, 1992) , we assume that banks service both local and global markets from financial centers. It is thus possible that both the level of global economic activity and its volatility can play an important role in determining the continuation or withdrawal of overseas bank ventures (Rugman and Li, 2007 
Data and methodology

Data
To test the hypotheses outlined above, we constructed a unique dataset. The database was constructed using the annual listings produced by The Banker magazine. In a recent study, Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski (2011) use Bankscope to compile data on bank withdrawals from foreign markets. Their data contain information on only 145 subsidiaries that withdrew from 54 countries during the period 1997-2009. They identify an important limitation of their source, in that they are able to compile only data on withdrawals; that is, they could not compile from Bankscope data on benchmark cases of banks that continued operating in the market and other organizational forms, namely, representative offices, branches and agencies.
Our sources enable us to overcome these difficulties and extend their work. Table 6 ).
The preceding exclusions for the sake of the reliability of the data employed left us with data on 408 banks headquartered in 77 countries, yielding an unbalanced panel of 4,643
observations. Of these 408 banks, 177 banks (2,795 observations) entered and continued in London during our sampled period, while 231 banks (1,848 observations) entered and subsequently withdrew from London.
Dependent variable: Our analysis focuses on the decision to continue operating in London or, conversely, the decision to withdraw from London. We construct a time-varying dependent (y) variable that takes the value of 1 if an overseas bank continues operating in London and a value of 0 if it withdraws from London (which we refer to as a closure). 5 The authors caution the reliability of accounting ratios used to proxy parent-bank advantages (p. 93). We attempted to collect data on accounting ratios as well, but this would have led us to drop the number of observations in the study drastically, additionally hampering our study due to the reliability of such historical data. We follow Buch and DeLong (2004) , who avoided using accounting data due to similar concerns in a study on cross-border mergers and acquisitions in banking. 6 Strictly speaking we would require to populate information on 55 banks x 75 years (1870-1945) = 4,125 observations. Despite significant effort we only managed to gather a highly unbalanced panel for 8 banks x 13 years (1925-1945) = 152 observations.
The independent variables:
We construct the independent variables following the literature identified in each of the hypotheses developed in the previous section. use world GDP to gauge the strength of the world economy as well as its volatility (σ(GDP)), on a yearly basis. The world GDP variable peaks in 1999 at $31.20trn. The volatility of world GDP is computed as the standard deviation of world GDP using a three-year rolling window and peaks during our sample at 2.41% in 1995; its lowest value is 0.12% in 1998. Finally, the interaction of volatility and size is measured as σ(GDP) x size (as defined earlier).
In Table 1 , we present the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study, separating the ones used to test the hypotheses defined earlier (as well as the ones used in robustness tests). Table 2 presents the correlation of the variables.
Methodology
We hypothesize that the continuation of a foreign bank's operations in the City of London is positively related to: (a) bank characteristics (initial organizational form, experience and size); 
where Y it refers to bank i and time t; it is a two-state dependent variable, which is assigned the value 1 when bank i remains in London and a value of 0 if it leaves London; α is the intercept; β, γ, and Φ are the unobserved coefficients for the unknown parameters, and ε it is an error term not suffering from the strict assumption of normality. (2003) . Mixed models comprise fixed effects and random effects and consider parameter heterogeneity by allowing parameters to be stochastic, which translates in our specification into simply considering the whole set of 408 banks as a random sample and modeling the unobserved within-and between-bank variability as a random effect. In this sense, mixed-effects logit is an improvement of the standard logit model, as it adds a number of random parameters poised to capture the unobserved heterogeneity. A duration-based formulation, most commonly known as survival analysis, would be an alternative method. However, research has shown that duration and logistic models are equivalent and produce very similar results (Lee and Urrutia, 1996) .
Empirical findings
Baseline specification
We present the results relating to the estimation of a version of expression (1) in Table 3 , denoted hereafter as the baseline specification. Amongst other relevant information, Table 3 contains coefficient estimates, p-values and odds ratios. Odds ratios are more informative than coefficient estimates because the former gauge the probability of continuation compared to the probability of withdrawal.
For the initial setup, holding agency as the control group, the results reveal a significant Given that large banks may incur higher leaving costs than small banks, it is possible that a slighter change in volatility might have a larger impact upon smaller, less well-established banks.
We address the eventual non-linearity by interacting volatility and size (column 2 of Table 3 ).
The coefficient on the interactive variable is positive and significant at the 99% level of confidence. Every unit increase in the size interacted with volatility increases the odds of continuation by 42.0% highlighting the greater likelihood of continuation of large offices compared to small ones (Hypothesis 3c).
In both specifications, columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 , we take size and same origin as random parameters. The likelihood ratio test comparing the fit of our model with the fit of a standard logit model is significant at the 99% confidence level. This suggests that the mixed-effects logit specification is a more appropriate for our dataset compared to the standard logit specification. Tables 4 and 5 Table 5 ); e) control for banking crises and world failures (Panels 4 and 5 of Table 5 ); f) control for the deregulation that followed London's big bang in 1986 (Panel 6 of Table 5 ); g) control for
Robustness checks
banks that had more than one operation in London (Panel 1 of Table 6 ); h) control for mergers by including banks engaged in mergers and a dummy in the baseline model ( Panel 2 of Table 6 ); i) control for consortia banks by including a dummy for consortium shareholders in the baseline model (Panel 3 of Table 6 ); j) run separate models aggregating representative offices, agencies and branches on one side, and subsidiaries and U.K. licensed banks on the other side, also including (findings reported in Table 7 : in Panels 1 and 2 aggregating representative offices, agencies and branches; and 3 and aggregating subsidiaries and foreign but U.K. licensed banks).
Of the sampled banks, 13% changed their organizational form over the period of their stay in London (of which 10% continue operating and 3% withdrew). For example, Europaeische
Hypo from Germany operated a subsidiary from 1994 to 1996 and changed to a U.K. licensed bank in 1997. We intended to investigate the impact of these changes by continued replacement of the dummies pertaining to the initial commitment in the baseline by as many dummies corresponding to the specific organizational form on a year-by-year basis, but the dummies turned out to be collinear. Thus, we ran the baseline specification excluding the 50 sampled banks that experienced changes in their organizational form and present the results in Panel 1 of Table   4 . Our previous results are confirmed, namely, in that the initial organizational form dictates whether or not banks will continue operating overseas.
The exclusion of 37 banks that entered London between 1945 and 1969 left the results qualitatively unchanged (Panel 2 of Table 4), with the exception of distance. Panels 3 to 5 of Table 4 present the results of excluding, alternately, U.S., Japanese and Swiss banks from the sample, as they represent 14.96%, 7.98% and 5.86% of the sampled banks, respectively. The results suggest that these countries are not driving our results, as the signs and significance of the variables remain unaltered, with the exception of Entry: subsidiary, which becomes significant at the 95% (Panel 4, without Japan) and 95% (Panel 5, without Switzerland) levels of confidence but with mixed signs. In Panel 6, we exclude the three influential countries altogether, and our baseline results are reinforced.
In Panel 1 of Table 5 , we use bilateral trade (computed as the sum of imports and exports on a yearly basis) to assess the post-entry role of the possession of information processing advantages with domestic customers (see, among others, Casu and Girardone, 2010) . Bilateral trade data are available from 1985 onwards; this reduced the sample to 3,068 observations. Although significant at the 90% confidence level, bilateral trade has an economically insignificant coefficient estimate of 0.000 (and an odds ratio of 1.000), indicating a similar probability of continuation and withdrawal. Ursacki and Vertinsky (1992) also failed to find a significant influence of bilateral trade on the entry of foreign banks in Japan as a proxy for the traditional follow-the-customer hypothesis. We re-ran the model with exports and imports separately (Panels 2 and 3 of Table 5 ) since these two measures could have opposite impacts on the continuation of foreign banks in London. The results are similar but stronger -imports increases the odds of continuation by 6.0% and exports by 5.8%, much lower compared to other factors discussed earlier.
In Panels 4 and 5 of Table 5 , and following Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski (2011), we control for banking crises in the domestic market and world failures, as they may influence the continuation of foreign banks in London. We collected data on banking crises on a yearly basis at the country level from Laeven and Valencia (2008) . The data are available from 1970 onwards and pertain to systemic banking crises when financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and financial institutions and corporations face major solvency difficulties. We collected data on world failures from the same source and aggregated information on bank failures, including assistance, at a global level, computed as a fraction of failed banking institutions.
Similar to Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski (2011) , banking crises cause foreign banks to withdraw from London. The odd of continuation for banks from countries that suffered banking crisis compared to banks originating in countries that did not suffer banking crisis is 0.42. However, world failures do not influence continuation of operations of foreign banks in London, since the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. A possible explanation is that the percentage of bank failures around the world may influence continuation and withdrawal from less important markets but not from London due to its pre-eminence in the global financial system.
We also estimated the baseline specification of our model with a dummy for the influence of the big bang in 1986. The findings indicate a positive coefficient for this variable at the 10% level of significance (Panel 6 of Table 5 ). The signs of the other coefficient estimates and their levels of significance remain relatively unchanged with the addition of this dummy variable, thus confirming our previous findings. Nevertheless, we ran an additional regression to test for differences between 1986 (big bang) and the rest of the period under observation. We constructed a new dummy variable (denoted by (1 -big bang) ), which was assigned a 1 if the year of analysis is not 1986, while keeping the dummy for 1986 (denoted big bang) in the set of independent variables, as defined previously. We then ran a unified regression with the right-hand side of the baseline specification entering twice: once multiplied by the dummy for big bang (1986) and another time multiplied by (1 -big bang) (see also Pozzolo and Focarelli, 2008) . We performed F-tests for the equality of the coefficient estimates obtained in the unified model for big bang (1986) and for (1 -big bang). Our results do not lead to the identification of a structural break attributable to the big bang.
In Panel 1 of Table 6 we present the findings for the baseline model augmented with banks with multiple operations in London. Our data showed that 53 banks had multiple operations in London (as we mention in Section 3). The findings are identical to those of the baseline model in general with the exception of the dummy on subsidiary that now appears to be negatively related to continuation with an odd of 0.54, since parents with more than one subsidiary tend to divest and focus their operations in fewer locally integrated shops. The variable same origin now appears negatively and significantly, at the 1% level, related to continuation; for every additional bank from the same domestic market reduces the likelihood of continuation by 14%, a finding consistent with our initial expectation.
In Panel 2 of Table 6 we present the findings for the baseline model controlling for merger activity. The findings are generally in line with those of the baseline model, with the exception of the dummy for subsidiary that now appears negatively related to continuation with an odd of 0.55 and the dummy for merger that is significantly related to continuation with a very high odd indicating that banks that bank mergers increase the likelihood of continuation. The negative sign for the dummy for subsidiaries should be related to the withdrawal of subsidiaries following mergers with other similar concerns. The variable same origin also appears negatively and significantly, at the 1% level, related to continuation; for every additional bank from the same domestic market reduces the likelihood of continuation by 15%, a finding consistent with our initial expectation.
In Panel 3 of Table 6 we present the findings for the baseline model controlling for banks that were previously shareholders in consortium banks created to engage in large infrastructure financing in the early 1970s. We constructed a dummy that takes the value 1 if the sampled bank is shareholder of a consortia bank, and 0 otherwise. In our sample 56 banks previously held stakes in a consortium bank. The dummy for consortium bank appears negatively and nonsignificantly related to continuation. Again the findings remain largely unchanged with the exception of the dummy for subsidiary that appeared negatively related to continuation with odds ratio of 0.62. The variable same origin now appears negatively and significantly, at the 1% level, related to continuation; for every additional bank from the same domestic market reduces the likelihood of continuation by 14%, a finding consistent with our initial expectation.
We also ran separate models aggregating representative offices, agencies and branches on the one hand and subsidiaries and U.K. licensed banks on the other hand. The results in Panels 1 and 2 of Table 7 confirm our previous findings in that bank operations through organizational forms integrated in the parent bank cause banks to withdraw from London. The results in Panels 3 and 4 of Table 7 are not conclusive in what concerns the organizational form since the coefficient for subsidiaries and locally licensed banks is not significantly different from zero.
Nevertheless, the results for the other variables are consistent with our previous findings. Three of the four regressions reported in Table 7 also show that the variable, same origin, representing the number of banks from the home country is negatively related to continuation with odds around 15%, i.e. every additional bank from the home country reduces the odds of continuation by approximately 15%. The sign for the variable, total banks, representing potential agglomeration benefits is negatively related to continuation but the odds are very small, 0.2%.
Endogeneity
It is possible that continuation of operations of foreign banks in London hinges on the home country institutional environment. We address this potential endogeneity by estimating our baseline specification using instrumental variables (IV). 8 We use rule of law (sources and descriptive statistics are indicated in Table 1 ), a composite measure of economic freedom in the home country, the enforceability of law and the absence of arbitrary action by citizens or institutions, as our instrument, as it proxies the institutional environment in the home country, which can favor continuation. Switzerland receives a very high score, and Nigeria receives a very low score. Panels 1 and 2 of Table 8 We also test the problem of the self-selection using a Heckman two-step regression model.
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In the first-stage probit regression, in which our dummy (1: continuation; 0: withdrawal) is the dependent, produces a propensity score denoted by lambda (λ, inverse Mill's ratio, Greene, 2008 ). This score is used to obtain the estimates of the self-selection correction. We use the lambda to estimate the second-stage together with rule of law, as defined earlier; and regulatory restrictiveness, the degree to which national authorities allow banks to pursue non-traditional activities (sources and descriptive statistics indicated in Table 1 ). For example, Indonesia has more restrictions on banking activities than Switzerland. The second-stage involves the estimation of an OLS regression of the dependent on the independent variables and the aforementioned dummy in addition to the self-selection correction lambda. We present the results in Panels 3 and 4 of Table 5 ; they show that the selection parameter λ is negative but not statistically significant. A negative coefficient of λ implies a downward bias in the estimated effect of the independent variables on continuation without the self-selection correction. Our results are thus confirmed and even reinforced.
Summary and conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature in two significant ways. First, we assemble a new dataset on overseas banking operations in London. Our data consists of information on 408 foreign banks from 77 countries since 1945 till 1999, giving us 4,643 observations; 2,795 of these represent banks that continue operating, and 1,848 represent banks that withdrew from London.
Second, we extend the vast literature on bank entry to study the factors driving the continuation of foreign bank activity. Specifically, we draw on internalization theory, with its emphasis on the role of information flows on domestic customers and intangible assets in the form of public goods that enable banks to compete on equal footing with their foreign peers; and the sequential entry model, which advocates the progressive commitment to markets to overcome the deterring effects of being foreign, to develop a set of hypotheses that are subjected to parametric tests.
Specifically, we develop hypotheses relating to bank characteristics (initial organizational form, experience and size), home-country characteristics (geographic distance, regulatory quality and presence of domestic competitors) and global market conditions (agglomeration of other multinational banks, global demand and volatility) to estimate a model of the decision to continue operating or withdraw from the market with the mixed-effects logistic regression technique. Our findings indicate that banks that established locally licensed operations, reflecting the initial strong internalization advantages in intangible assets that assume the form of public goods, exhibit higher probability of continuing operations. Local experience also significantly influences continuation, indicating that the liability of being alien in a market reduces over time. The size of local operations also determines continuation, suggesting that survivors may well have exploited their flexibility to cope with swinging demand conditions over time. Banks that established operations integrated into the parent, reflecting the initial strong internalization advantages in the form of information flows on domestic customers, exhibit lower probability of continuation in the market. Banks from distant countries also exhibit a lower probability of continuing in the market.
World demand and volatility influence continuation, although in opposite directions-positive for demand and negative for volatility-but global economic volatility interacted with size indicates a higher probability of continuation of large operations compared to smaller operations.
The possession of internalization advantages in the form of information flows on previously established relationships with customers is considered an important driver of bank entry. Our findings indicate that these advantages play a secondary role in the decision to continue operating overseas. Other internalization advantages stemming from the possession of intangible technical, market-making and managerial assets that assume the form of public goods within multinational banks (alongside local experience and the size of local operation, home country internalization advantages and global market conditions) play a determining role in the decision to stay overseas.
These latter advantages have received far less attention in the literature and are likely to drive the global consolidation of multinational banks.
Foreign bank entry has been explained by internalization, with its emphasis on the costs and difficulties of transacting information-intensive products in external markets, and the sequential expansion model, with its emphasis on the progressive commitment to the market to overcome hurdles associated with unfamiliarity of operating in alien markets. Our findings indicate that these two theories complement each other in the explanation of the reasons driving foreign banks to continue operating overseas. Internalization with its emphasis on bank and country advantages, and flexibility, explains the reasons why overseas banks can compete on an equal footing with local and other international competitors and adapt to changing demand conditions over time. The sequential expansion model explains how local experience further reinforces internalization, permitting long-term continuation in the overseas market.
From a bank managerial perspective, our results suggest that executives at banks' headquarters are likely to view the overseas presence of their subsidiaries and locally licensed banks very differently from representative offices, agencies and branches; they are also likely to view proximate, more experienced and larger overseas offices very differently than distant, recent and small operations. Managers may be likely to pull out of these latter operations, more so if they are in the form of representative offices, agencies or branches, especially amid global economic volatility. From a regulatory perspective, our results suggest that regulatory authorities that may be concerned about the behavior of foreign banks may want to monitor more closely the activity of subsidiaries and locally licensed banks in their markets because these banks are more likely to continue operating and, at the same time, are more likely to tap into the local markets and seek more central bank funding facilities rather than parent support amid global economic volatility.
Finally, we hope that our study will lead to similar investigations of other financial centers.
Further investigations of this kind could yield different results that may ultimately help us understand better the reasons driving banks to continue operating in foreign markets. We present the results of regressing the dependent taking the value 1 if the bank continues in London and the value 0 if the bank withdraws from London on the correspondent bank characteristics, home country factors and world factors. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. We present the results of regressing the dependent taking the value 1 if the bank continues in London and the value 0 if the bank withdraws from London on the correspondent bank characteristics, home country factors and world factors, excluding potentially influential observations. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. We present the results of regressing the dependent taking the value 1 if the bank continues in London and the value 0 if the bank withdraws from London on the correspondent bank characteristics, home country factors and world factors, controlling for additional factors that could influence banks' response. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. We present the results of regressing the dependent taking the value 1 if the bank continues in London and the value 0 if the bank withdraws from London on the correspondent bank characteristics, home country factors and world factors. In Panel 1 we extend the baseline to include banks entering London from 1925 to 1944 In Panels 2 and 3 we control additionally for mergers and consortia banks. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. We present the results of regressing the dependent taking the value 1 if the bank continues in London and the value 0 if the bank withdraws from London on the correspondent bank characteristics, home country factors and world factors, pertaining to two separate models. Model 1 aggregates representative offices, agencies and branches, while Model 2 aggregates subsidiaries and U.K. licensed banks. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
